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Abstract  
A substantial number of wind energy projects have recently been stalled or abandoned in 
the United States of America (US) due to concerns over the effects of wind turbines on 
radar and military sites. The US Department of Defence (DOD) has reported that utility 
class turbines can have a „significant impact‟ on the operational capabilities of air defence 
radar, can interfere with military testing and training capabilities, and can obstruct 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitoring (DOD 2006). The American Wind Energy 
Association (AWEA) estimates 10,000 MW of wind generation capacity was held up or 
abandoned in 2009 due to such concerns (cited in Warwick 2010).  
 
This dissertation is a pilot project that aims to look behind such public statements to: 
1.  Define the nature of US concerns pertaining to the effects of wind turbines on radar and 
military sites. 
2.  Determine the recent impact these concerns have had on wind energy projects in the 
US. 
3.  Identify and analyse proposed solutions to the problem.  
 
Results of the literature review, case study analysis, and industry interviews conducted for 
this pilot study show: 
1.  Additional clutter, shadow, seismic noise and flight obstruction are the main concerns 
the DOD has with proposed wind projects.  
2.  DOD concerns have had an extensive impact on the rapid development of the US wind 
industry and could prevent the US from reaching its target of 20% of energy from wind 
energy by 2030. 
3.  Proposed solutions available to overcome DOD concerns are vast; however the range 
of solutions available, which are certified by the DOD, need to be expanded.  
 
This pilot project is intended to provide a platform for further research into this issue.  
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1. Introduction  
Wind energy is increasingly viewed as a viable option to expand renewable energy 
generation in the United States of America (US). US installed wind generation capacity 
accounts for 22% of the world‟s installed wind generation capacity (BP 2010), 2.3% of the 
US energy mix (AWEA cited in Science Daily 2011), and grew more than any other US 
energy source from 2008 to 2010 (BP 2010). The US Department of Energy (DOE) 
envisions that 20% of the country‟s electricity could come from wind energy by 2030 (DOE 
2008). To support this vision, the current US Government aims to double US renewable 
energy generation by 2011 (Freshfields 2009) and supports wind energy development 
through tax incentives and government grants under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA) of 2009. 
 
Despite strong growth in government support for the US wind industry, US wind energy 
projects are being stalled by concerns from government defence departments over the 
impact of wind turbines on radar and military sites. The US has a strong commitment to 
national security, with a defence budget of over $650 billion (DOD 2011). The country‟s 
policy on national security focuses on preventing acts of terrorism on American soil, and 
fighting war in Afghanistan to disrupt and dismantle al-Qa‟ida (United States Government 
2010). In serving this policy the US Department of Defence (DOD) has publicly advocated 
that utility class turbines can have a „significant impact‟ on the operational capabilities of air 
defence radar, can interfere with military testing and training capabilities, and can obstruct 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty monitoring (DOD 2006).  
 
The American Wind Energy Association (AWEA) estimated 10,000 megawatts (MW) of 
wind generation capacity was held up or abandoned in 2009 in the US due to radar and 
military site concerns (cited in Warwick 2010). Stu Webster (2010), speaking on behalf of 
AWEA members, testified to Congress in 2010 that the growth necessary to achieve 20% of 
US electricity from wind energy is unlikely to be achieved; without first resolving radar and 
airspace concerns.   
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1.1.  Research Scope and Objectives 
This dissertation is a pilot project that seeks to look behind such statements of concern to 
understand: 
  What is the nature of concerns pertaining to the effects of wind turbines on radar and 
military sites in the U.S? 
  How have radar concerns recently impacted wind energy developments in the U.S? 
  What solutions have been proposed to resolve such concerns and how valid are they 
from a US wind development perspective? 
  What type of support (e.g. governance and funding) is required to help implement viable 
solutions?  
 
This pilot study is focused on solutions for the US. Examples of successful governance and 
mitigations from alternative countries will be analysed for their suitability to the US.  
 
1.2.  Research Methodology 
This pilot project uses a synthesis of a literature analysis, case study analysis, and industry 
interviews. The literature survey and case study analysis cover public information from 
databases, news articles, wind/radar forums, and previous research.  They aim to define 
radar and military site concerns raised around wind turbines, identify any impact that 
concerns have had on wind development in the US, and discover proposed solutions to 
such concerns from the US and the rest of the world (where applicable). The case study 
analysis aims to provide relevant examples from these areas. 
 
The aim of the industry interviews is to enhance the findings of the literature survey by 
providing the insights from the wind development industry, impacted government agencies 
and radar experts. Representatives of these target groups will be asked open ended 
questions around the following areas: 
  How viable are radar and military site concerns raised by the DOD?  
  What impact have radar and military site concerns had on wind development projects in 
the US in the last 3 years (in MW delayed, rejected, abandoned)? 
  How viable are the proposed solutions to these concerns?  
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  What is required (e.g. governance and resources) to implement the most viable 
solutions?  
Note: Only non-classified information will be sought in these interviews 
These questions may be tailored to include more detail questioning depending on the 
expertise of the participant. 
 
Eight individuals were invited to be interviewed. Participants were interviewed in a semi 
structured manner over the phone, with a transcript of the interview being scribed 
throughout.  Answers to both scripted questions and conversational leads were recorded. 
To ensure each interview was conducted in an ethical manner, guidance and ethical 
approval (number 2011/043) was obtained from the Murdoch University Human Research 
Ethics Committee for this research. Results of industry interviews will be presented under 
their relevant theme heading for the issue. 
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2. Issue Context  
2.1.  US Wind Industry 
The US has over 35,000 MW of installed wind energy capacity, with the potential to power 
9.7 million homes, and avoid 62 million tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions annually (AWEA 
2009). This shows rapid expansion from its installed wind energy capacity of 2,500 MW ten 
years ago. Wind energy achieved an average growth of around 40% annually from 2004 to 
2009 and at least 36 states now have utility class turbines installed (AWEA 2009), which are 
typically over 400feet (ft) (122m) tall and 300ft (92m) wide (Warwick 2010). 
 
The US does not have binding federal renewable energy targets (AWEA 2009); however 
rapid wind energy development is strongly supported by the current government, which 
aims to double US renewable energy generation by 2011 (Freshfields 2009). The current 
government also supports the DOE‟s vision for 20% of US electricity supply to come from 
wind by 2030 (also known as „20/30‟) and intensive state wind energy targets reinforce this 
vision. In Massachusetts for example, the state government aims to have 2,000 MW of 
installed wind power by 2020; an aggressive target considering Massachusetts only had 
around 9 MW of installed wind energy capacity in 2009 (Butcher 2010).  
 
Rapid industry growth has also been boosted by government incentives. Provisions in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) allow production tax credits (traditional 
wind development incentives) to be converted into an investment tax during the economic 
downturn. Incentives for renewable energy research and manufacturing are also provided 
under The Recovery Act. These government incentives supported around 3,000 MW of new 
capacity in 2009 (AWEA 2009).  
 
The DOE‟s 20/30 assessment estimates 16,000 MW of wind energy capacity will need to be 
installed each year by 2018 (DOE 2008) to achieve the 20% target. Representatives of the 
US wind industry are dubious this will be achieved without first resolving radar and airspace 
concerns pertaining to wind turbines (cited in Warwick 2010). 
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2.2.  US National Security  
The US Department of Defense (DOD) is America‟s largest and oldest government 
agency, with its headquarters at the Pentagon. The DOD manages a large inventory of 
installations in over 5,000 different locations and utilises over 30 million acres of land 
for its activities. The sites range from small half-acre single navigational aids to 3.6 
million acre missile ranges (DOD 2010). The DOD website (2010) advocates: 
“The national security depends on our defense installations and facilities being in the 
right place, at the right time, with the right qualities and capacities to protect our 
national resources. Those resources have never been more important as America 
fights terrorists who plan and carry out attacks on our facilities and our people.” 
For fiscal year 2012, a defence budget of $671 billion was been requested. This 
includes a $553 billion discretionary budget to fund base defence programs and $118 
billion for overseas contingency operations focussed on Afghanistan and Iraq (DOD 
2010). 
2.3.  Turbine Impact Assessment Process 
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in the US has the regulatory authority to review 
and evaluate the impact of new structures on civilian and military airspace use (DOE 2008). 
This impact assessment process is applicable to many new wind energy projects and is the 
mechanism through which many wind developments have been held up, delayed or 
abandoned. Wind projects are unable to start construction without FAA approval. 
 
Wind farm developers are required to file a notice of proposed construction for each wind 
turbine within a wind project that may affect the navigable airspace. This is defined in the 
FAA Advisory Circular 70/7460 2K as: 
  Objects greater that 200 ft (61m) in height above the ground level at its location.  
  Objects within 20,000 ft (6098m) of a Public-Use or Military Airport or Seaplane Base 
where object would exceed a 100:1 horizontal slope from the nearest point on the 
runway.  
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  Objects within 10,000 ft (305m) of a Public-Use or Military Airport or Seaplane Base 
where the object would exceed a 50:1 horizontal slope from the nearest point on the 
runway. 
  Objects within 5,000 ft (1524m) of a Heliport pad and the object would exceed 25:1 
horizontal slope. 
(FAA 2000) 
 
Process guidelines also substantiate that developers are required to submit paperwork 
stating the exact locations of the wind turbines 30 days before ground breaking (Magnuson 
2010). 
 
To determine whether a proposed construction is a potential hazard to air safety or security, 
the FAA consults a number of relevant authorities, including the Department of Defence 
(DOD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). A notice of „no hazard‟ is issued 
by the FAA when there are no concerns about air safety caused by a proposed 
development. This enables a wind farm construction to commence from an air safety and 
security perspective. Alternatively, the FAA issue a notice of „presumed hazard‟ when 
consulted authorities raise concerns over air safety or security. Notices of presumed hazard 
require wind developers to work in conjunction with the FAA and relevant authorities, in an 
effort to minimise potential hazards (DOE 2008). At this point in the process many wind 
development projects are delayed.  
 
2.4.  Fundamentals of Radar 
2.4.1.       Basic Radar Systems 
„Radio Detection and Ranging‟, more commonly known as „radar‟, is used in both civilian 
and military operations for air traffic control (ATC), air defence, and weather forecasting. A 
basic radar system consists of a transmitter, an antenna, a receiver, and a processor (DOD 
2006). The transmitter emits pulses of electromagnetic energy, which bounce off objects, 
also known as „targets‟, in a radar‟s line of sight. The antenna and processor detect and 
analyse energy echoes reflected back to the radar (Auld 2006). The figure below illustrates 
the process of a basic radar system. The information contained in the reflected signal and  
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the manner in which it is processed determines the basis of operation for a radar (DOD 
2006).  
 
 
Figure 1- Basic radar system  
Source: (DOD 2006, 11) 
 
There are two main forms of radar surveillance systems, primary and secondary. Primary 
surveillance radar (PSR) uses the basic radar process above to provide a two or three 
dimensional representation of a target in a region (DOD 2006). A number of factors can 
affect a PSR‟s ability to process reflections off a target of interest, including; the power of 
the transmitter, the distance from the target, the size of the reflection [or radar cross section 
(RCS)] of a target, antenna geometry, obstructions, and reflections from other objects e.g. 
hills, buildings, wind turbines (DOD 2006). 
 
In contrast to a PSR, secondary surveillance radar (SSR) uses coded signals to obtain 
information about a target. SSR systems are also called „beacon‟ systems and help air 
defence staff distinguish between friendly and hostile aircraft. An SSR sends out a coded 
signal which is received by aircraft. The aircraft‟s transponder translates the signal and then 
transmits a coded signal back to the SSR (DOD 2006).  This means SSR systems use 
much stronger direct signals from an aircraft‟s transponder, rather than weaker reflected 
signals used by a PSR. Consequently, SSR are typically unaffected by reflections from 
other objects (DOD 2006); an important point for understanding the impact of wind turbines 
on PSR and SSR.  
 
2.4.2.       Types of Radar Used in the US 
The following section outlines radar types used by the DOD, FAA, and National Oceanic 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the US. Webster (2010) points out the US have a  
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relatively aging radar fleet with around 80% of all US radars being implemented from the 
1950s to 1980s. 
 
Air Traffic Control Radar (ATC) 
ATC radars consist of both primary and secondary radar systems and are used to monitor  
aircraft  in  and  around  air  fields.  Modern  ATC 
radars typically have PSR coverage of up to 60 
miles  and  SSR  coverage  of  up  to  120  miles 
(Raytheon 2011). There are 283 ATC radars of 
various models in the US. 110 are modern digital 
ASR-11 (deployed in the 1990s), 135 are ASR- 
10 (deployed in the 1980s) and 38 are 
 
Figure 2 - UK Watchman ATC Radar 
 
Source: DOD 2006, 19, Figure 11 
analogue ASR-8 (deployed in the 1970s) (NWCC 2010). The figure above shows an 
example of an ATC radar with the PSR and SSR identified. 
 
Long Range Radar (LRR) 
LRR (shown below) are described as the “back bone of primary surveillance in the US” 
(Blackman cited in NWCC 2010, 24). LRR track aircraft in between airports and 
 
Figure 3 – ARSR-4 Radar 
Source: Aftergood 2000 
Are used for air defence (Brenner et al 2008). Modern 
systems are digital, and provide coverage up to 250 
nautical miles (nmi) (Aftergood 2000), while older 
systems are analogue (Seifert 2009). There are 128 long 
range radars of various model types in the US (NWCC 
2010); these are predominantly located in perimeter 
states (Aftergood 2000). Two dimensional FPS-20, ARSR 
1s and ARSR 2s are the most common type of  
LRR with 65 systems across the country. These systems were deployed in the 1950s 
and1960s and were upgraded in the 1980s. Modern three dimensional ARSR-4s, deployed 
in the 1990s, are the next most common with 43 systems in the US. There are also 13 
ASRS-3s (deployed in the 1970s and upgraded in the 1980s) and 7 TARS systems 
(deployed in the 1980s) (NWCC 2010).  
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Weather Radar 
There are 158 WSR-88D Next Generation 
Weather  Radars  (NEXRAD)  in  the  US 
which  are  used  to  monitor  weather 
conditions.  The  majority  of  these  were 
deployed in the late 1980s (NWCC 2010). 
These  radars  create  Doppler  maps  to 
illustrate  rain,  hail,  and  snowfall  patterns 
(DOD 2006). The figure to the right shows 
US NEXRAD radar. 
 
Figure 4 - US NEXRAD Weather Radar 
Source: DOD 2006, 21, Figure 13 
 
Missile Early Warning Radar (EWR) 
EWR (shown below) are large, high powered phased array systems designed to detect and 
track objects with low radar reflectivity at long ranges with a high level of accuracy. These 
radars have a range in excess of 5,000 kilometres (km) and are required to discriminate  
 
Figure 5 - US Beale Early Warning Radar 
Source: DOD 2006, 20, Figure 12 
between closely spaced objects; such as 
nuclear weapon re-entry vehicles and 
possible counter measures designed to 
confuse defensive systems. There are two 
EWR radars in the US, one on the east 
coast in Massachusetts and another on the 
west coast in California. (DOD 2006).    
 
2.4.3.       Target Detection  
Auld (2006) describes electromagnetic energy as „fairly indiscriminate in what it reflects off‟ 
(5). Therefore ATC radar and LRR adopt particular processing techniques to distinguish 
between the electromagnetic echo of aircraft and the echoes of unwanted targets, referred 
to as „clutter‟. Examples of clutter include objects such as buildings and towers (Kelly 2011). 
The parameters radar use to identify aircraft from clutter are described by Kelly (2011) 
below: 
1.  Aircraft have a high level of reflectivity, known as a radar cross section (RCS). Radars 
can use threshold filters to avoid detection of objects with a low RCS.  
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2.  Aircraft occupy predictable elevations. Radar antennae can be oriented to focus on 
echoes from a particular elevation. 
3.  Aircraft are in motion at the moment they reflect electromagnetic energy causing an 
apparent change in frequency of the return, also known as a „Doppler‟ effect (Wolff 
2011). Radars can use moving target indication (MTI) and moving target detection 
(MTD) to differentiate and focus on echoes from moving targets, cancelling out 
stationary objects. 
4.  Aircraft do not hover or remain still for extended periods of time. Constant false alarm 
rate (CFAR) processing can be used to determine the average background echo per 
cell of radar coverage. Amplitude thresholds can then be used to only pick up objects 
with echoes above that of the background average.  
 
RCS thresholds, antennae orientation, MTI/MTD processing, and CFAR processing are all 
minimum standard for most modern radar (Kelly 2011).  Weather radar uses similar 
parameters to distinguish between actual and unwanted weather echoes (EURMETNET 
2005).  
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3. Wind Turbines: US Causes for Concern 
3.1.  Why Wind Turbines Affect Radar  
Wind turbines affect radar as their echo characteristics often match those of an actual 
aircraft or storm pattern, which radar seeks to track. For example: 
  Wind turbines have incredibly high reflectivity. Studies conducted by the DOD (2006) 
showed that the RCS for a turbine could be greater than that of a long haul, wide bodied 
aircraft such as a 747. Therefore RCS filters have difficulty in differentiating wind 
turbines from aircraft. The following figure illustrates the RCS of a 1.5MW wind turbine 
against other objects that may be detected or rejected by radar. 
   
 
Figure 6 - Comparison of RCS for different objects 
Source: DOD 2006, p15 
 
  Utility scale wind turbines can occupy similar elevations to aircraft, especially when 
located on hill tops. Radar requirements to monitor low flying aircraft means wind 
turbine and aircraft can share the same elevation (Kelly 2011). Therefore typical 
antennae orientation can have difficultly filtering out wind turbines.  
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  Wind turbine blades are moving at the time of reflection, meaning that typical MTI/MTD 
algorithms are unable to detect the difference between a turbine and an aircraft (Kelly 
2011). 
  Wind turbine echoes can vary over time depending on wind direction and blade 
orientation. This causes problems for CFAR processing as wind turbines can cause 
consistently high background echoes which can raise the CFAR threshold. This means 
smaller aircraft, with a lower RCS than a turbine, may not be detected. Additionally, 
radar may treat inconsistent large returns from turbines as actual aircraft targets (Kelly, 
2011). 
 
Based on the information above, typical processing methods used by radar to focus on valid 
targets can be ineffective at filtering out the unwanted echoes or „clutter‟ caused by wind 
turbines. 
 
3.2.  Effects of Wind Turbines on Radar 
Wind turbines cause two main types of interference with radar, direct interference and 
Doppler interference. Direct interference is caused by the high reflectivity of the turbine 
components: towers, nacelles, and blades. This can reduce the sensitivity of the radar via 
increased background noise, create false readings, and shadow areas of radar coverage. 
Alternatively, Doppler interference is caused by the moving blades of a turbine which can 
cause false targets, false MTI/MTDs, and impacts both airborne and fixed radar (Seifert 
2009).  The following section explains each of these impacts in more detail. A variety of 
research has been conducted which verifies the following impacts of turbines on ATC, LRR, 
EWR and weather radar. A selection of this research is summarised below. 
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Organisation  Research Summary 
Network of European 
Metrological Services 
French research into a wind farm‟s capacity to block beams, 
cause clutter, and cause Doppler interference on weather radar. 
Results show wind farms up to 30km from the radar have a high 
potential to degrade meteorological data and impact weather 
“nowcasting and forecasting” (EUMETNET 2005, 2).   
US Department of 
Commerce – National 
Telecommunications 
and Information 
Administration 
US study into the effects caused by wind turbines, greater than 
250 feet (76m), on ATC and FAA radar. Results show there are 
numerous documented “cases of deleterious effects” (Lemmon et 
al 2008, 1).  
UK Royal Air Force  UK tests to determine the effects of wind farms on ATC primary 
surveillance radar. Results confirmed shadowing and clutter 
effects which can be “highly detrimental to the safe provision of Air 
Traffic Services” due to a decrease in „probability of detection‟ and 
the inability to differentiate between turbine-induced clutter and 
actual aircraft (UK Royal Air Force 2005, 1). 
Keele University 
Applied and 
Environmental 
Geophysics Group 
(UK) 
UK tests to determine seismic and infrasound noise generated by 
wind farms in the vicinity of Eskdalemuir seismic monitoring site in 
Scotland. Results indicated impacts of seismic noise could be 
controlled through the allocation of a „noise budget‟; within which 
detection capabilities are not compromised (Styles et al 2005).     
Table 1 - Research Confirming Wind Turbine Interference 
 
To better understand the nature of US DOD concerns, the DOD‟s 2006 report ‘Effects of 
Wind Farms on Military Readiness’ which also confirms turbine interference effects will be 
referenced extensively in the following sections. 
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3.2.1.       Shadowing & Clutter 
Shadowing 
The DOD (2006) describe the shadowing effect wind turbines have on radar in the following 
way: 
“Objects in the path of an electromagnetic wave affect its propagation 
characteristics. This includes the actual blockage of wave propagation by large 
individual objects or interference in wave continuity due to diffraction of the beam by 
individual or multiple objects“ (DOD 2006, 13-14)”  
 
The following figures illustrate complete and partial blocking of electromagnetic waves and 
diffraction of electromagnetic waves. Clusters of wind turbines typically cause diffraction of 
a radar‟s electromagnetic energy and therefore create shadow zones or blind spots where 
monitoring is less efficient. The amount of shadow incurred will be dependent on the size of 
the wind farm and the topographical features which surround it. 
 
 
Figure 7 – Shadowing 
Source: DOD 2006, 14 
 
Figure 8 - Diffraction 
Source: DOD 2006, 14 
       
Clutter 
Clutter is another key effect that wind turbines can have on radar. DOD (2006) defines 
„clutter‟ as „any unwanted reflected signal that enters the radar receiver and can interfere 
with the determination of the desired attributes of the target of interest‟ (11). Ian Chatting, 
Head of Research in Britain for Vestas – the world‟s largest wind energy company, explains 
wind farms cause a cloud of reflected signals known as „clutter‟. As an aircraft flies into this 
cloud it is difficult to determine whether it is the same or an alternative aircraft that has 
come out (cited in Reuters 2010).  
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DOD (2006) advocate that „clutter‟ could occur if any portion of the turbine appeared in the 
radar‟s line of sight and exceeds accepted RCS noise thresholds. Studies conducted by the 
DOD (2006) showed the RCS for a turbine could be greater than that of a long haul aircraft. 
As wind turbines are stationary and near the surface of the earth, this appears as „clutter‟ on 
air defence radar. The amount of clutter is in direct proportion to the number of turbines 
within the line of sight of the radar. The DOD (2006) study concluded that a single turbine 
located at a distance from the radar will have minimal impact; however a large number of 
turbines over a wide sector of the radar‟s coverage will significantly impact its performance. 
This is supported by Ministry of Defence research trials in the United Kingdom.  
 
Impacts of Shadow and Clutter 
When asked about efforts to improve the range of technical mitigations available to 
overcome wind/radar issues, the Wind and Radar Expert interviewed by the author 
explained, “There is military concern around the use of wind farms (clutter and shadow 
zones) by unfriendly aircraft to transition below the radar level of detection.” Thereby 
allowing unfriendly aircraft to conduct missions undetected. The Wind and Radar Expert 
extended his answer to say that drug trafficking was an area of military concern for such a 
manoeuvre. Magnuson (2010) suggests this DOD concern also pertains to pilots who have 
hijacked a plane. Schleck Associates (2010) suggest clutter and shadow zones could make 
it hard to maintain security for potential terrorist targets. The DOD (2006) highlight that 
shadow and clutter areas may minimise the tie that security forces have to react to potential 
threats.   
 
An interview with a Military Pilot with US experience conducted by the author confirmed that 
it is possible for drug traffickers to have the appropriate flight equipment to fly below the 
radar (e.g. helicopters or jets). When asked about the feasibility or terrorists or drug 
trafficker having access to such assets the Military Pilot said, “It‟s absolutely plausible. Drug 
traffickers looking to move product across US borders have been known to use 
submarines. Having access to a jet is definitely not out of the question.” In considering this 
option the Military Pilot added “An important consideration is the distance between the take 
off point, the wind farm, and potential targets” pointing out that different aircraft types would 
have different refuelling requirements and therefore different capacities to complete such a 
mission.  
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Theoretically, the inability of a radar operator to track an aircraft for a short period over and 
near wind farm is therefore a valid concern. Presumably proposed wind energy sites near 
potential terrorist targets or near potential trafficking entry routes would therefore have lower 
acceptance for loss of coverage. The DOE (2008) website however points out, “Wind 
developers have successfully installed over 21,000 megawatts of wind power capacity 
across the US and 93,000 megawatts across the world in the past 20 years without one 
documented case of enabling an attack on any nation.” This leaves the question open as to 
how significant this theoretical threat is. 
 
Shadowing and clutter also affect weather radar. The Forth Worth Star (2010) reported that 
clusters of turbines near Albany in the US produce radar shadows to the north and west of 
Dyess. These shadows are of concern as they could potentially hide the appearance of 
severe weather approaching a base. Butcher (2010) describes how a wind turbine at the 
Jimney Peak ski resort in Hancock produces a signature resembling a thunderstorm, which 
cannot be distinguished from heavy rainfall. Kalinowski (2010, cited on www.faa.gov) 
explains how the false appearance of storm activity on Next Generation Weather Radar 
(NEXRAD), caused by wind farms, makes it hard to provide accurate weather information to 
pilots; therefore decreasing the accuracy and safety of weather forecasts.  
 
While the pilot study results indicate shadow and clutter have adverse affects on radar, is 
there an acceptable level of interference for radar? From an interview conducted by the 
author with a Wind and Radar Expert it was found that “Just because a radar can see a 
turbine, that doesn‟t mean the radar cannot do its job. The aviation industry is of the view 
that a little bit of sparkle is manageable, while the military are concerned with any loss of 
coverage…The metrics you use to determine what is allowable are very specific to the site.” 
the Wind and Radar Expert said when asked about promising wind/radar mitigation 
technologies. 
 
3.3.  Effects of Wind Turbines on Military Sites 
Beyond radar interference, Dougherty (2008) identifies obstruction and safety as additional 
concerns the DOD have related to wind turbines. Dense development of wind turbines near  
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airspace, test ranges, and training ranges used by the US military can occupy the same 
altitude as aircraft. Wind turbines can be over 400ft tall (122m) (Warwick 2010) and military 
flight training missions can be as low at 10ft (3m) (obtained from author‟s interview with a 
Military Pilot); meaning wind turbines can physically obstruct low flying missions or aircraft 
during take off and landing. A representative of Dyess Air Force Base in Abilene, where 
more than 2,000 turbines have been built within a 100 mile radius, advocated that wind 
turbines could pose hazards for B-1 bombers and C-130 transports used in the area. Base 
officials also found wind farms in West Texas interfered with low attitude training missions 
that can extend up to 120 miles from the base (Fort Worth Star 2010). The DOD (2006) 
highlights that a single turbine poses the same aviation obstruction as radio antennas and 
cell phone towers, and as such could be mitigated through the same process; however the 
number and proximity of turbines being installed makes them harder to mitigate with 
traditional measures.  
 
Overhead transmission lines associated with wind farms also provide a flying hazard for 
aircraft, which poses a safety risk to flight and weapons training operations (DOD 2006).  
From the interview conducted by the author with a Military Pilot with US experience, it was 
confirmed that: “Both the poles and the lines provide obstacles to aircraft. The lines are 
particularly hard to see while using night vision equipment”. The Military Pilot added when 
asked about the validity of such concerns, “There have been many aircraft accidents due to 
wire strike. They‟re definitely a concern for pilots on low flying missions”. Flight training and 
testing concerns however, are likely to be restricted to only particular areas of the US. Tom 
Vinson, a spokesperson for AWEA who was interviewed by the author, said “There‟s a 
limited number of training areas in the US for such DOD activities. Issues around training 
areas primarily come from Nevada, California, and Texas.” Vinson said when questioned 
around the split between objections due to military sites versus radar. 
 
3.3.1.      Seismic and Infrasound Noise 
Seismic and infrasound noise is the final publicly stated area of concern for military 
operations. Wind turbines produce seismic and infrasound noise that could “contaminate 
monitoring stations providing data to support the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
and US nuclear explosion monitoring effort” (DOD 2006 Appendix 2, 61). There are 4 
primary and 10 auxiliary International Monitoring Systems (IMS) and several Atomic Energy  
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Detection Systems located in the US. These systems use a seismometer array to monitor 
nuclear explosions in line with the CTBT (DOD 2006). Studies by Styles et al (2005) confirm 
that sophisticated equipment such as seismic arrays can detect seismic noise caused by 
wind turbines.   
 
Interference with military design and development sites was also confirmed as a viable 
concern. A Wind and Radar Expert interviewed by the author said, “A wind turbine changes 
the environment meaning there isn‟t the same baseline for testing from one day to the next.” 
The Expert said when commenting on efforts to increase the range of viable technology 
solutions. These results are confirmed by seismic noise tests conducted in the UK at the 
Eskdalemuir; however these tests also pointed out that only the most sophisticated 
monitoring equipment would be affected (Styles et al 2005).  
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4. Impact of Concerns on US Wind Development 
4.1.  Scale of Impact Versus National Targets 
In 2009 10,000 MW of proposed wind energy generation capacity was delayed in the US 
(AWEA, cited in Warwick 2010). From interviews conducted by the author with Tom Vinson 
from AWEA, it was revealed the approximately another 10,000 MW was delayed in 2010 
and that no data had been collated for 2011. The following impact map presented by Seifert 
(2009) shows existing wind projects (in blue) and proposed wind projects affected by radar 
interference issues (in purple) against radars used by the DOD (in red). This map 
demonstrates that numerous projects, many of substantial MW size, are affected by this 
issue. 
 
Figure 9 - Impact Map 2009 
Source: Seifert 2009 
 
The overall impact for the US wind industry is outlined in the following figure, which shows 
delayed wind capacity and implemented wind capacity against the growth forecast required 
to achieve 20% of US energy from wind by 2030.   
20 
0
5,000
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
2008 2009 2010 2011*
Year
M
W
Abandoned
Held up
Under construction
Installed
 
Figure 10 - Issue Impact: MW Installed v.s. DOE 20% 2018 Target 
 
Source: (Graph data sourced from AWEA (2011, 2010, 2009, 2008), interview with Tom 
Vinson (2011), AWEA (cited in Warwick 2010), and Blackman (2009)). Notes: Dashed red 
line represent ‘20/30’ target installation, * 2011 first quarter data only, ‘Held Up’ and 
‘Abandoned’ information available for 2009-2010 only.  
 
The above figure indicates a significant amount of wind development has been held up in 
the US in recent years. Recent wind energy implementation falls well below the „20/30‟ 
target capacity required to be obtained by 2018 (shown by the dashed line). Based on this 
comparison, it appears this impact could prevent the US wind industry from meeting the 
„20/30‟ target without a rapid increase in wind energy implementation. This is reinforced by 
the following figures which show „20/30‟ target wind energy installation and wind energy 
implementation to date.   
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Figure 11 - 2030 vision for wind energy development 
Source: Seifert 2009 
 
 
Figure 12 - US Wind Power Capacity Installations by State (2011) 
Source: AWEA 2011,6 
 
4.2.  FAA Assessment – A Catalyst for Delay 
A review of the literature indicated the existing FAA process for the notification and review 
of proposed wind farm constructions appears to suffer inefficiencies related to timing and 
cooperation. In 2010 the Deputy Undersecretary of Defence for Installation and 
Environment, Dorothy Robyn, voiced concern that wind developers were notifying the FAA 
late in the wind project approval process; often after selecting sites and engaging investors.  
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Ms Robyn identified that late notification limits the scope for collaborative efforts to identify 
potential issues and mitigation options (cited in Magnuson 2010).  Alternatively, Levitan 
(2010) shows how input from government agencies has been uncoordinated and also last 
minute. This is demonstrated in Caithness Energy Shepherd‟s Flat wind development 
project, summarised in the case study below.   
 
Case Study – Shepherd’s Flat Wind Energy Project. 
Shepherd‟s Flat is a 909 MW wind farm, proposed by Caithness Energy to be built in 
northeast Oregon (Levitan 2010).The project is set to be the largest wind farm in the world 
(Eilperin 2010). It involves a 1.4 billion US dollar turbine deal with General Electric (Learn 
2010), is expected to avoid over 1.2 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions per year, 
and will create over 400 construction and 35 permanent jobs (Coal Geology 2010) in an 
economically depressed community (Eilperin 2010). By 2010 the project had been in 
 
Figure 13 – Shepherd’s Flat Project 
Source: Washington Post (2010) 
development for almost nine years (Eilperin 
2010).  Caithness had been through more 
than four years of permit approval with 
county, state and federal governments, and 
had worked out concerns with the US Navy. 
Despite being notified of the project 3 years 
earlier (Air Force Times 2010), the US Air 
Force raised concerns „at the 25th hour‟ 
about the turbines‟ potential to create further  
clutter and aircraft tracking interference  
issues for the long range Fossil radar at Ore, over 70 miles away. This denied the project its 
final FAA permit required for construction (Eilperin 2010).  If construction was not completed 
by 2012 Caithness would lose its stimulus funding under the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act. Construction delays therefore could potentially damage the project‟s 
viability (Levitan 2010).  
 
Eilperin (2010) reports the Air Force‟s action „sparked an intense lobbying battle and White 
House-led negotiations‟ by senior Obama officials trying to avoid a decision which could 
cost America 16,000 jobs. Oregon senators, Wyden and Merkley, alongside Caithness and  
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General Electric officials also lobbied the White House; with Wyden using his nomination for 
future DOD staff as a bargaining tool to help ensure the issue was resolved. Merkley‟s 
Press Office (2010) reported that after „a months long stand off‟ the Pentagon announced it 
would no longer block the project and would instead upgrade the nearby radar system, 
improving its ability to cope with clutter. A move that would „eliminate the threat to other 
planned wind farms in the area‟. 
 
The lack of coordinated consultation for affected agencies was further highlighted by Tom 
Vinson, a representative of AWEA, who advocated (in an interview with the author) that 
vigilant wind developers attempt to engage relevant military input as soon as possible. 
Vison said when commenting on the „next steps‟ required to progress the issue. Vinson also 
commented that military departments are not always responsive and collaborative efforts to 
identify and resolve hazards can be inconsistent (cited in Magnuson 2010). The lengths to 
which wind developers can be prepared to go to in order to avoid such issues is reinforced 
by claims from Kalinowski (2010) that primary FAA radar leaseholders have been offered 
financial incentives from wind developers not to renew their FAA contract and to lease to 
wind developers instead (cited on FAA website 2010). 
 
4.2.1.       Inhibiting Concerns – Science or Politics? 
The congressional battle required to progress the Shepherd‟s Flat wind project, opens 
questions about the extent to which radar and military site concerns are genuinely scientific 
and to what extent they are political.  Iberdrola Renewables, another company with wind 
developments in the Shepherd‟s Flat area, revealed that when radar issues have been 
raised in the past developers have been helped by Congress members, who are keen to 
bring employment to the area (cited in Levitan 2010). This political intervention would 
appear to override the scientific intention of the FAA impact assessment. This overriding 
can be interpreted in various ways: 
 
1.  Genuine DOD concerns may be being superseded by political agendas for economic 
development. The extent of political intervention required in the Shepherd‟s Flat case 
study could be testament to this interpretation.   
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2.  DOD concerns may be less scientific and more political than publicly advocated. Recent 
military base closures may be a potential motive for preserving current base 
environments. Watson (2010) reports that 20 major military installations will be shut 
down by 2011 under the DOD Base Closure Alignment Commission. Watson (2010) 
recognises that base closure can have a negative economic impact in rural 
communities reliant on military business and employment. Based on this information it 
could be possible that wind turbines, which have the potential to degrade radar 
coverage and military sites, could be objected to in order to preserve the quality of base 
facilities and therefore help prevent a base from being selected for closure.    
 
In evaluating the contrasting agendas of rapid wind development and national security, 
Seifert (2006) argues the issue matters when wind farms pose an unreasonable risk to 
national security and the benefits offered by the wind farm do not outweigh their interference 
impact. Providing an objective assessment of this balance, which is supported by Congress, 
remains a current challenge for the FAA impact assessment process.   
 
4.2.2.       DOD Energy Siting Clearing House  
Tom Vinson, an AWEA spokesperson interviewed by the author, said the DOD has taken 
measures to improve the FAA impact assessment process (when asked about 
inefficiencies in the FAA assessment process). Vinson stated that the DOD have 
reorganised how they engage with wind developers, “Under Section 358, fiscal year 2011, 
of the National Defence Authorisation Act, they have developed a one-stop-shop for 
developer engagement called the Department of Defence Energy Siting Clearing House… 
The Clearing House has been methodically going through the backlog of development 
applications and sorting them out” Vinson said. The new process has been thought to be a 
positive move according to the author‟s interview with Vinson. Key engagement changes, 
cited from the author‟s interview with Tom Vinson, include: 
  The proposed construction notice period for wind developments has been increased 
from 30 to 45 days. 
  The Clearing House provides one access point to all relevant authorities at the 
Pentagon and is the only place for an official DOD response to a proposal. 
  Only four people within the DOD now have the authority to say „no‟ to a proposal.  
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Tom Vinson also pointed out, when interviewed by the author, “There are still some issues 
with individual services not being as collaborative as the Clearing House, however overall 
we‟ve received positive feedback... People feel like they have access and their concerns 
are being heard”. While these changes appear to improve some of the issues related with 
the FAA process, whether the Clearing House is able to provide an objective justification for 
concerns that lead to a balanced assessment of the impact against the benefits of wind 
energy proposals is an important question. A spokesperson from the Clearing House was 
invited to be interviewed by the author to discuss this topic, however the spokesperson was 
unable to participate due to a busy schedule. 
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5. Issue Mitigations 
Wind industry participants acknowledge there is no single solution to radar and military site 
concerns due to variables such as: location, radar type, mission type, and terrain type in 
each proposal (Magnuson 2010).  The following section outlines DOD approved and 
proposed mitigating solutions to the issue. 
 
5.1.  DOD Approved Mitigations 
The DOD in ‘Effect of Windmills on Military Readiness’ (2006) concluded non- technical 
solutions to be the only proven mitigation to avoid the degradation of radar capability and 
interference with military training due to wind turbines.  Non- technical solutions involve 
avoiding placing wind turbines in a radar‟s line of sight via zoning, terrain masking or terrain 
relief.  
 
5.1.1.      Zoning 
Zoning refers to placing turbines a predetermined distance from a radar to avoid 
interference. The aforementioned DOD report (2006) recommends a distance of 30 nautical 
miles (nmi) would be required for turbines with blade tips that protrude over 300 ft (91m) 
above the local terrain. Zoning is a mitigation supported by policies pertaining to wind 
turbine siting in many European countries. In Austria, wind farms greater than 10km from an 
air defence radar will receive no objections.  In The Netherlands, only wind farms within 15 
nmi (approx 24 km) from a military radar require review. In Germany, policy enforces a 
protection zone of 10km around all ATC radars, with an area of interest up to 18km from 
ATC radars. These policies address military and civilian concerns over radar shadowing (for 
Germany and the Netherlands), electromagnetic interference and obstacles to low flying 
routes (in Austria) (DOD 2006). Zoning is a mitigation also used in United Kingdom Civil 
Aviation Authority policy as a means to manage shadowing and false plots on secondary 
surveillance radar (SSR). Turbines over 24km from an SSR are not thought to impose a 
problem (Kelly 2011). For primary radar in the UK all proposed wind turbines in the line of 
sight of the radar must undergo consultation with the UK Ministry of Defence, regardless of 
distance (DOD 2006).  
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Zoning is also a technique that has been used to overcome seismic noise interference for 
nuclear explosion monitoring in the UK. Studies in Eskdalemuir in the UK, site of the longest 
operating seismometer array and very good wind development areas, found that turbines 
within 10km of nuclear monitoring sites should be prohibited (Styles et al 2005). From 10km 
to 50km, the study concluded that wind turbines should not exceed a predetermined „noise 
budget‟, and turbines over 50km from the radar should have no restrictions applied 
pertaining to this monitoring type (Styles et al 2005). The method used to determine these 
protocols has been accepted as sound by the DOD (2006) at which time recommendations 
were made for similar testing in the US, on a site to site basis to allow for differing 
background seismic noise.  
  
5.1.2.      Terrain Masking and Relief 
Under UK, US and European policies mentioned in the previous section, turbines may be 
placed closer to the radar after further analysis determines there are no effects or the 
effects can be suitably mitigated. Non-technical solutions to facilitate this include ensuring 
there is elevated terrain between the radar and the turbine (terrain masking) or ensuring the 
elevation of the radar is above that of the turbine (terrain relief) (DOD 2006). The following 
figure illustrates how terrain masking helps remove turbine interference on a radar system. 
Kelly (2011) also identifies terrain masking as the “simplest method of mitigation” (17). 
 
 
   
No terrain masking – majority of turbines in 
radar line of sight 
Some terrain masking – less turbines in 
radar line of sight 
Figure 14 – Illustration of Terrain Masking 
Source: DOD (2006) Figure 30 and 32, 42-43 
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Analysis using wind farm models and terrain databases is required to determine whether 
this mitigation is suitable for a particular wind farm. The DOD (2006) advocate that while the 
analysis is not complicated it can be time-consuming. 
 
5.1.3.       Viability of DOD Approved Solutions 
The practicality of using zoning alone can be limited due to the vast distribution of US radar. 
Seifert (2009) highlights this through the following figure which displays recommended 
turbine siting areas (in green) based on radar location (red zones indicating a 20nmi buffer 
zone). 
 
 
Figure 15 – Recommended Turbine Siting Areas  
Source: Seifert 2009 
 
While this map implies substantial unaffected areas for wind development, Bill Troia, 
International Business Developer for Long Range Radars at Lockheed Martin, identified a 
key reason for competing land use between wind farm and radar and military training sites; 
noting that flat, open areas with good visibility to the horizon are desired for both uses (cited 
in Magnuson, 2010). In addition, Ed Ciardi from the National Oceanic Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) acknowledged that altering the position or orientation of turbines 
could represent a loss in energy productivity or efficiency for wind developers (cited in  
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NWCC 2010); representing an opportunity cost that could be considerable. Alternatively, 
Kalinowski (cited on www.faa.gov 2010) suggests moving the radars to facilitate zoning is 
an impractical option. Additional radars may be added, but existing coverage cannot be lost. 
The FAA does not have a stock of spare radars and new radars would require a change in 
national airspace systems e.g. reporting points and airspace fixes. 
 
Brenner et al (2008) argues non-technical solutions alone are narrow-sighted, stating the 
2006 DOD report favoured to “block the installation of offending turbines, rather than to 
attempt to find technical means of ameliorating the turbine impact” (4).  The following 
section explores a range of technical solutions that have been proposed to help solve the 
issue. 
 
5.2.  Proposed Technical Mitigations 
Kelly (2011) suggests, where non-technical mitigations such as terrain shielding are not 
possible, there are three theoretical ways to limit the impacts of wind turbines on radar:  
  Improving radar design to enable radars to distinguish between wind turbines and 
actual targets e.g. radar upgrades, gap fill radar. 
  Reduce the reflectivity of the turbine e.g. via stealth technology to reduce the turbine‟s 
RCS. 
  Remove the clutter from the radar‟s vision, e.g. blanking or suppressing of radar cells 
where turbines are known to be.  
The following sections discuss current and future technologies that have been suggested 
for the US market.  
 
5.2.1.       Radar Upgrade 
Radar upgrades are pertinent to the US due to the aging nature of the US radar fleet. Ken 
Kingsmore from the DOD (cited in NWCC 2006) explains that prior to September 11, 2001 
the Joint Radar Planning Group in the US, who manage long range radar assets, focused 
primarily on maintaining border sites such as Hawaii, Alaska and Guam; leaving internal 
radars to remain untouched. After the September 11 terrorist attacks however, the group 
became more inwardly focused adding 170 additional sites covering mainland US. Few 
radars have been updated in the last decade. Kalinowski (cited of www.faa.gov 2010)  
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highlights that, due to their age, many current FAA radars have limited capability to filter out 
clutter. In addition, making adjustments to older radars, e.g. reducing their sensitivity to 
eliminate clutter, can cause actual targets to be missed.  
 
Gary Seifert, an expert in radar and wind at the Idaho National Laboratory, advocates 
modern radars are better equipped to deal with turbine impact issues than older radars 
(cited in NWCC 2006). Modern radars are typically digital (versus analogue) and have a 
greater band width, which Webster (2010) argues can improve the radar‟s resolution and 
ability to track targets between turbines. New radars also include digital processing 
capabilities such as multidimensional detection, and pulse shapes which can help 
differentiate between aircraft and wind farms (Brenner et al 2008). Brenner et al (2008) 
point out that computing power has increased 600 fold since the 1990s. The older systems 
are often hard wired and unable to be changed, limiting their flexibility.  
 
Modern radars that have been shown to improve aircraft detection and/or reduce the 
visibility of wind farms include the Raytheon ASR-11 (produced in Canada) and the UK 
equivalent, the Lockhead Martin TPS-77, which enable the UK Ministry of Defence to lift 
objections to over 3,000 MW of offshore wind projects (Webster 2010). A Wind and Radar 
Expert interviewed by the author advocated “Lockhead TPS 77 is a fabulous radar that is 
designed to provide advanced targeting and coverage for the military… Published limits (for 
the radar) indicate it can provide coverage as close as 500m to the edge of the wind farm.” 
Tom Vinson, an AWEA spokesperson interviewed by the author, said the DOD has 
replaced an old ASR-8 with an ASR-11 at Travis Air Force Base. Vinson stated in the 
interview that “The DOD are not comfortable to say they validate these mitigations” 
however, “they would agree this has improved coverage”. Vinson also said in the interview 
that the DOD had committed to a proposal to field test TPS-77 radar, which has been 
previously field tested in Europe with positive results.   
 
NOAA‟s NEXRAD radar is also favourable, with its superior processing capability for 
weather forecasting (Brenner et al 2008). For secondary radar systems, Mode Select 
(Mode-S) radars have the ability to selectively interrogate aircraft and request specific 
information; however for Mode-S SSR to be effective, all aircraft should be equipped with 
Mode-S compliant transponders (Kelly 2011).  
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Although each of these modern systems has a greater ability to manage the effects of wind 
turbines, at present no radar is capable of distinguishing a wind turbine echo from a valid 
aeroplane target echo and therefore no system can consistently provide un-degraded 
coverage in the area of wind farms (Kelly 2011). This view was supported by the Wind and 
Radar Expert interviewed by the author who said: 
“You can not completely eliminate clutter. New software allows you to track… right up 
to the edge of a turbine and then pick it up right after the turbine, therefore reducing 
the size of areas without coverage… Raytheon‟s ASR11 is very effective at reducing 
zones with poor visibility to one or two (radar) cells either side of a turbine.” 
 
Geoff Blackman, a consultant on wind radar issues for Westslope Consulting, recommends 
older US ATC radars such as the ASR-8 (38 in US) and ASR 9 (135 in US) radars should 
be considered for replacement with ASR-11 radars (cited in NWCC 2010, p25) due to their 
improved „clutter‟ processing capability. Blackman added that some of the newer radars 
already installed might cope with wind farm interference through additional software 
upgrades. Tom Vinson, an AWEA spokesperson interviewed by the author, said 
“The only issue (for radar upgrades) is cost. A Lockheed radar is in the vicinity of $15 - $20 
million and is not going to be viable everywhere; particularly for single developer projects. 
Only areas with multiple developer interests will, most likely, be able to afford such a cost.” 
 
5.2.2.       Software Upgrades 
The following software upgrades can be added to modern radars or digitised older radars to 
improve their coverage of areas with wind turbines. The following subsections describe 
each software upgrade. 
 
Concurrent Beam Processing 
Concurrent beam processing involves two radar beams, one high and one low, which are 
obtained and processed simultaneously. This helps identify wind farm clutter from actual 
aircraft (Webster 2010). Lok and Drake (2009) established that tests in Stockholm in 2005, 
FAATC in 2007, and Travis Air Force Base in 2008 have shown the advantages of 
concurrent beam processing over standard switched beam configuration. Tests at Altamont  
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Pass Wind Farm showed ~20% improvement in probability of detection.  Geoff Blackman, 
from Westslope Consulting, recommends this upgrade would be beneficial to Long Range 
US radars such as FPS-20 series and ARSR 1/2s, and for ATC ASR-11 radars (NWCC 
2010, p25) to help them cope with wind turbine interference.  
 
Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) Processing 
Constant False Alarm Rate (CFAR) processing suppresses data in radar cells that have 
high level signals from turbines, which contribute to the average background level. 
Suppressing the high return cells reduces the average background level and detection 
threshold, which improves the radar‟s ability to detect aircraft over wind turbines (Webster 
2010). CFAR processing can be implemented manually using a map of known turbine 
positions or automatically using turbine positions from the radar‟s track extractor. Butler and 
Johnson (2003) state the manual method is the least demanding as it only affects the radar 
signal processor. However, CFAR processing would be considered ineffective if the turbines 
are so dense they raise the background level in all cells.  
 
Enhanced Tracking Techniques 
Enhanced tracking techniques are a proposed mitigation, which is in the process of 
implementation and evaluated on ASR-11 radar systems (Lok and Drake 2009). The 
enhancements aim to look over (rather than through) the turbines by increasing the antenna 
tilt and altering the radar‟s beam transition. The following figure indicates the improvements 
to probability of detection that can be made with such techniques.  
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Probability of detection before: 67.53% 
 
Probability of detection after: 92.72% 
Figure 16 – Enhanced Tracking Techniques Testing (Lok & Drake 2009) 
Source: Lok & Drake 2009 
 
Webster (2010) supports this research arguing increasing the height of radar installation, or 
using increased antenna elevation angle, has been shown to eliminate a significant portion 
of performance problems. 
 
High Resolution Clutter Mapping 
Clutter maps store information about the average background clutter for successive radar 
cells. Clutter maps can be incorporated into the MTI/MTD configuration. Decreasing the 
size of clutter map cells will increase the number of cells between turbines and in turn the 
probability of detecting aircraft between cells (Butler and Johnson 2003). Implementation of 
this mitigation requires a wide instantaneous band width transmitter and receiver. In 
addition, a signal processor and plot and track extractor that can cope with high data rates  
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and volumes (Butler and Johnson 2003). Geoff Blackman from Westslope Consulting, 
suggests that enhanced clutter map processing is useful on ARSR-4 long range radars to 
help see through clutter, but notes that it requires a redesign of many of the radars essential 
components (cited in NWCC 2010). 
  
5.2.3.       Gap Filler Radars 
Gap filler radars, are secondary radars which are strategically placed to cover an area 
obscured by a wind farm (Webster 2010). Brenner et al (2008) describes how a second 
view of the obscured area, provided by the gap filler radar, makes it possible to process the 
effect of wind farms out through data fusion (p 9). Levitan (2010) supports this theory 
explaining that shortwave radars placed within or adjacent to the wind farm can work in 
tandem to provide the extra coverage required.  
 
X -band panel and gap filler radars have been identified as possible solutions which have 
been trialled on NEXRAD weather radars. Studies for application on long range primary 
radar are also being conducted (Lok and Drake 2009). Raytheon have conducted tests 
using X-band gap filler and panel radars to cover targets above the wind farm, noting that 
the narrow pencil beam is able to avoid interference as opposed to the wide beam radars 
already in place.  The following diagrams illustrate how gap filler radars provide an 
additional view of the same region, can cut through clutter using beam radars, or can look 
over clutter using elevated views. 
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Figure 17 - Gap Filler Radar 
Source: Lok and Drake 2009 
 
 
 
Figure 18 - Pencil Gap Filler Radar 
Source: Lok and Drake 2009 
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Figure 19 – X Band Panels 
Source: Lok and Drake 2009 
 
Lok (2009) identifies this mitigation as suitable for ATC radars, such as ASR–10, ASR-11, 
and ASR- 23, as well as LRR. Testing of this mitigation has been carried out on an ASR-11 
radar at Travis Air Force Base and further testing was scheduled for late 2010 on an ASR-
10 radar in the Netherlands (cited in NWCC p, 21). From interviews conducted by the 
author with a Wind and Radar Expert it was highlighted that, “X band radar is very effective 
at picking up aeroplanes in between turbines. Data gathered in Oregon showed it could 
track private aircraft without transponder before, after, and over a wind farm; while long 
range could only see before and after a wind farm”. Lok (2010) does however note 
complications with the implementation of x-band panels due to the growing height of 
turbines and the requirement for panels to be positioned higher than the turbines (cited in 
NWCC 2010).  
 
Kelly (2011) advocates gap filler radar plays an important role in the UK in enabling 
„blanking‟ of main radars. National Air Traffic System En-Route Ltd (NERL) policy requires a 
minimum of three radars to cover a wind farm area before one can be blanked. Gap fill 
radars help provide the additional views required. Webster (2010) points out that a gap 
filling radar by Pager Power, at the low cost of $250,000, allowed the implementation of 
multiple MW of wind power in Scotland, while not reducing the level of detection in the  
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radar. Brenner et al. (2008) recommends developers should have the option to help fund 
gap-filler radars, or long distance radars. Brenner et al (2008) suggests the contribution 
would equal a few percent of the turbine farm construction costs; estimating the cost of a 
single radar as between $3-8 million, relatively small when compared to the $2-4 million 
cost of a single turbine.  
   
5.2.4.       Stealth Turbines 
Stealth turbines are focused on lowering the RCS of wind turbines by altering the shape of 
turbine components and using radar absorbing material (RAM) on the turbines (Bryanton et 
al 2007). This can reduce the clutter effects of the wind farm by either altering the Doppler 
return of the turbines, so it falls outside the detectable range of the radar, or by making the 
turbine‟s Doppler return uniquely identifiable and able to be rejected by the radar (Raytheon 
2006). RAM can be either active or passive. Passive RAM works by phase cancellation or 
absorbing and converting electromagnetic energy to heat. Active RAM, also known as 
phase-switched screens (PSSs), delivers low reflectivity by redistributing the 
electromagnetic energy incident over a wider bandwidth (Bryanton et al 2007).  A Wind and 
Radar Expert interviewed by the author thought positively of stealth turbines, advocating “It 
can reduce the distance at which turbines interfere with radar by around 30%. Allowing you 
to site turbines closer to radar without interfering with it.”  
 
This mitigation is still in the testing phase with turbine manufacturers such as Vestas and 
QinetiQ leading research and design. Studies by Bryanton et al (2007) identified the main 
sources of scattering on turbines, and delivered prototype RAM components for the Vestas 
V82 turbine (p4-5). The study revealed the main areas of mono scattering were caused by 
the tower (75%) and the turbine blades (20%). 
 
The required RCS reduction for each turbine component was calculated to be: tower 20 
dBms, blade 10 dBms, and nacelle 15dBms. RAM design was delivered via a polycarbonate 
skin with a foam core which was considered low maintenance, light weight and fire retardant 
(Bryanton et al 2007). Results of the study indicated the RCS of the tower and the nacelle 
can be reduced significantly with shaping alone. RAM components for the turbine blades 
further reduced the RCS (Bryanton et al 2007).  QinetiQ has tested its prototypes on  
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shorter-wavelength radars, which they claim also significantly reduce the RCS (Brenner et 
al 2008).  
 
Pinto (2006) outlines key design requirements for stealth turbines as the ability to: reduce 
turbine RCS, endure UV exposure and a temperature range of -40 to +60, and cost less 
than 10% of the overall turbine. Brenner et al (2008) comments that the impacts of the RAM 
layer on aerodynamics and turbine longevity is currently unknown. QintetiQ alternatively 
suggests modifications to the inside of the blade, using layers of circuits and reflectors, 
which they hope would be effective on L-band radar lengths used by US air-defence. 
 
5.2.5.       Non-Technical Solutions 
Tom Vinson, an AWEA spokesperson interviewed by the author, indicated the solutions for 
turbine impacts on testing and training routes “are not as technical” but “more operational”, 
for example “curtailing a wind farm during a military testing period” or “altered training 
routes”. Other non-technical mitigations that have been proposed for radar include:  
  Upgrades to navigational aids, published data or Notices to Airmen, and procedural 
changes where new wind farms have been implemented (Kalinowski 2010, cited on 
FAA website).  
  Policy changes for ATC radars (already adopted in the UK) which dictate that all 
readings, including false returns from wind farms, must be treated as real aircraft; 
meaning a minimum lateral separation of 5nmi should be maintained where critical air 
surveillance operations take place (DOD 2006).  
  Additional training of ATC staff to help them discriminate between wind farm clutter and 
aircraft (Webster 2010). Butcher (2010) however suggests for weather radar that a 
single turbine can be accommodated by meteorologists, but an entire farm is difficult to 
mentally account for.  
  Mandating that aircraft near and above wind farms have secondary radars in use 
(Brenner et al 2008). 
 
5.3.  Evaluation of Proposed Solutions 
The solutions to reduce the interference of wind turbines with radar and military sites seem 
plentiful, although the viability of each can be restricted by cost, development phase and  
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acceptance by the DOD. A Wind and Radar Expert interviewed by the author said, 
“Integrating infill or gap fill radars will be the most promising mitigation in the short term. 
That would be followed by improved software mitigation techniques. In the longer term 
stealth technology, replacing old radars with newer radars, and integrating advanced signal 
processing algorithms are promising solutions.” In broad support of this Tom Vinson, an 
AWEA spokesperson interviewed by the author, said the wind industry had come up with a 
“radar by radar mitigation plan”. Vinson advocated the best value would be in mitigations 
that could “clear the most projects”. The practicality of such a plan will be dependent on 
funding and cooperation between government agencies and wind developers.   
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6. Cooperation, Funding & Research  
The Wind and Radar Expert and AWEA representative, interviewed by the author, both 
listed cooperation between government agencies and wind developers, dedicated funding, 
and a common research plan as necessities for expanding the range of approved mitigation 
solutions available to wind/radar concerns. The following section reviews the progress 
made to date in these areas and highlights areas where future effort is still required. 
  
6.1.  Cooperation 
Numerous efforts have been made by industry groups and government organisations to 
bring together the wind energy developers, radar experts, and government defence 
agencies to help resolve wind/radar concerns. Despite extensive consultation, outlined in 
the table below, the US progress to resolve wind/radar concerns appears slow.  
Year  Key interactions 
2005    Congress mandates DOD study into wind/radar interactions. 
  The Californian DOD and Wind Industry work to identify areas for potential 
wind development which are not subject to radar issues. 
2006    DOD delivers ‘Effect of Windmills on Military Readiness.’ The report 
describes the science of possible impacts for select groups of radar and 
mission types.  
2007    June – FAA/DHS include information on the FAA website which shows 
most long range radar systems. NEXRAD and DOD flight paths are added 
over time. 
  October - Federal agencies and the wind industry meet at Sandia National 
Laboratory to discuss technical arguments about wind/radar impacts and 
tools to assess the impacts. 
  November – Federal agencies and the radar industry meet at Idaho 
National Laboratory to discuss the impacts and brainstorm research and 
development topics. 
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Year  Key interactions 
2008    January - DHS brings government and radar industry experts together to 
help deliver the JASON report “Wind Farms and Radar”. 
  September - FAA Competition for the Skies Conference which involved 
side meeting with wind industry, DOD, DHS, NOAA, and FAA and 
agreement by all parties to develop a joint research and development plan 
to study and prove mitigation options. 
  October - San Antonio Surveillance Conference. DOE and AWEA attend 
DOD/DHS/ NOAA/FAA conference to provide a wind industry perspective 
on the issue and define what is needed. They recommend the DOE to be 
the facilitator of joint efforts. 
2009    February – US and British agency and industry counterparts meet to 
discuss points and merits of British model of collaboration (Aviation Plan 
and MOU) 
  October – AWEA, DOD, DHS, FAA, NOAA and DOE discuss progression 
towards an Memorandum of Understanding, and research and 
development 
Ongoing    AWEA continues to work with DHS and other federal agencies to develop a 
plan for radar and wind farm modelling tool 
  AWEA developing a list of candidate research and development activities 
as a first step towards a US Aviation/Weather Plan 
  Individual developers interface with DOD/DHS/FAA/NOAA on specific 
projects 
  WINDPOWER 06 (PA), 07 (CA), 08 (TX), 09 (IL): Listening sessions for the 
government where it is agreed that all stakeholders need to improve their 
efforts. Sessions have delivered progress in identifying stakeholders, 
understanding the nature of impacts, and agreeing on collaborative work. 
Table 2 - History of US Cooperation 
Source: Webster 2010 
Tom Vinson, an AWEA spokesperson interviewed by the author, shared the following view 
on collaboration to date, “I would say there is agreement that there are challenges and  
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alignment as to what those challenges are.  There is also broad agreement there are 
technological solutions that are available, or could be available.”  
 
One major proposal that has failed to gain traction to date is to follow the UK model for 
resolution. Tom Vinson (2010) from AWEA advocated the British wind energy association – 
UK Renewables – was able to negotiate with the Ministry of Defence and Civil Aviation 
Authority to bring about early agency engagement, clear timeframes for resolving conflict, 
and provide a research and development agenda (cited in Magnuson). Warwick (2010) 
highlights UK Renewables and the UK government formed a consortium to fund mitigation 
research that allocates funding on the likelihood of success and wind capacity at stake.  The 
UK aviation plan recognises “There is no universal solution to mitigate the effects of wind 
turbines on radar” hence making their mission to “develop a suite of mitigation solutions 
endorsed by aviation stakeholders” that facilitates “constructive dialogue” between wind 
developers and aviation stakeholders (Blackman 2009). In 2008 the UK plan was focused 
on gap filler radars, mandatory transponder zones, studies into SPE-3000, Raytheon 
radars, stealth technology, and web based screening tools (Blackman 2009). 
 
6.2.  Research & Funding 
6.2.1.       Research 
Seifert (2006) highlights that only experts from the DOD, FAA and DHS can determine 
whether a mitigation is acceptable. Therefore further research from these bodies is required 
to expand the range of viable mitigations. Tom Vinson, an AWEA spokesperson interviewed 
by the author, said the DOD is working on collaborative research with the DOE, DHS and 
MIT Lincoln Laboratory, which involves “field testing the Lockhead TPS 77” and “looking at 
testing „off the shelf‟ infill and gap fill radars that have had limited field trials”. A Wind and 
Radar Expert interviewed by the author added, “I believe they‟re looking at what changes 
can be made to the dynamic mapping e.g. RAG mapping and clutter mapping.  
They‟re also using clutter mapping and combining that with new post processing systems 
and improved filtering mechanisms.” From the author‟s interview with Vinson, it was 
identified the timeframe for this testing is the “next 2-3 years”. Vinson however, questioned 
whether these research areas were at the “top of the list” in terms of “what would clear the 
most projects”.  
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6.2.2.      Funding 
Brenner et al (2008) argues there is significant potential for mitigations however there is 
currently no source of funding to test proposed mitigations in the practical environment. 
NOAA has a well established research plan but no source of sufficient funding to execute it. 
At present neither wind farm manufacturers nor the government support significant 
research activities (Brenner et al 2008). A recommendation of the JASON report was that 
parties on both sides should provide funding towards this testing (Brenner et al 2008.). 
Dougherty (2008) proposes $30 million in congressional appropriations for a 5 year effort 
with a split of the costs: 
  $10 million to federal agencies to develop wind-radar impacts projects. 
  $10 million to a public-private partnership to test existing and emerging technology 
fixes. 
  $5 million to develop and maintain a „wind-radar impacts toolkit‟ focused on pre-
screening capabilities and viable mitigation options. 
  $5 million to an overseeing organisation to manage projects. 
 
6.3.  Issue Next Steps 
So what are the favoured next steps to help progress these issues? Tom Vinson, an AWEA 
representative interviewed by the author, suggests „early engagement‟ needs to be defined 
for the FAA impact assessment process. Vinson said if agencies want developers to 
engage 12-18 months prior to construction, “There needs to be agreement about what can 
be discussed at that stage and what information developers need to have. Micro-siting of 
the turbines for example doesn‟t happen until fairly late.” When interviewed by the author, 
Vinson also said an agreed research, development and validation plan is important. Vinson 
said “Now the debate is around how we validate solutions, which ones do we validate, and 
who is going to pay for that.  Once a solution has been validated there will also be debate 
around who pays for its deployment.” 
 
A Wind and Radar Expert, interviewed by the author supported the need for a research 
agenda, “The most important thing to do now is push the research agenda, the military will 
like options such as TPS 77, but these incur a significant investment.” The Wind and Radar  
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Expert suggested instead that research into synchronising “multiple radars looking at the 
same area” while avoiding “issues with accuracy” would be beneficial to gap filler solutions. 
 
The Wind and Radar Expert also suggested that improvements to the current technology 
validation process are required, “Radars are much more capable than you‟d expect, it‟s the 
processes that we approve them under that is concerning. Certification can take 2-3 
years… The time it takes to certify and accept new technologies is a major issue.”  
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7. Evaluation of Pilot Study Results 
This pilot study has broadly fulfilled the requirements set out in the objectives; information 
gathered has allowed the issue to be defined, impact of concerns to be identified, and 
possible solutions to be highlighted; therefore providing a platform for further research into 
more detailed aspects of the issue covered.   
 
A limitation of this pilot study is the small number of participants interviewed. Only eight 
participants were invited to interview due the amount of time required to obtain ethical 
approval for the research. Of these eight, only three were able to participate. For more 
robust results, the findings could be tested against a wider populace. In addition, as the 
topic broadly covered a selection of key radar types and military site issues, only a selection 
of solutions could be included. More detailed analysis of solutions for particular radar or 
military site issues could be covered in further research. 
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8. Conclusion and Recommendations 
Genuine concerns have been raised in the US around the impact of wind turbines on radar 
and military sites. The concerns are varied; however this pilot study shows that each 
concern is theoretically plausible. Additional clutter, shadow, seismic noise and flight 
obstruction are the main concerns the DOD has raised for proposed wind projects. A 
particular concern for the DOD appears to be the use of radar clutter and shadow zones by 
unfriendly aircraft to move below the radar; enabling them to potentially conduct missions 
undetected.  
 
These DOD concerns, raised through the FAA turbine impact assessment process, have 
had an extensive impact on the rapid development of the US wind industry. They have 
contributed to the delay of US installed wind capacity, which is currently falling short of 
„20/30‟ installation targets. From analysis results it appears feasible this could prevent the 
US from reaching its target of 20% of energy from wind energy by 2030. A key challenge for 
the FAA impact assessment process is to provide an objective outcome that is respected by 
Congress and is not overturned by alternative political agendas. 
 
The proposed solutions available to help resolve wind turbine interference with radar and 
military sites are vast; with gap fill radar, software upgrades, radar upgrades, and stealth 
technology as favoured solutions. Issue experts concur that an agreed research, 
development, and validation process is important to expand the range of mitigating 
technologies available. Pivotal to this agreement is the funding source for such activities. 
 
On the basis of this pilot study, recommended areas for further research include: 
1.  Detailed analysis of solutions for a specific radar type or military site concern. 
2.  Technical research into enabling technologies (for example synchronisation of multiple 
radar views). 
3.  Detailed analysis of proposed policy solutions that could provide incentives for 
cooperation and change. 
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9. Glossary 
Term   Definition 
20/30  DOE assessment that 20% of US energy could come from wind energy by 2030  
ARRA  American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
ARSR-1 /ARSR-2 
/FPS-20 
1950‟s model, 2D, L-band frequency long range radars with a maximum range 
of 200 miles. Radar model is being replaced with ARSR – 4 (Radomes 2011). 
ARSR 3  3D long range radar providing coverage up to 240 miles (Radomes 2011). 
ARSR-4  The most modern 3D long range surveillance radar. Radar provides improved 
reliability, improved ability to track small object (via minimised clutter), and 
coverage up to 250 nautical miles (Aftergood 2000). 
ASR-8  Analogue Air Surveillance Radar with limited processing capability when 
compared to modern radar types. Radar type is being replaced with modern 
ASR-11 radar (Wolff 2011). 
ASR-10  Flexible, modern radar that meets the requirements of the US FAA / DOD ASR-
11 next generation radar (Raytheon 2011). 
ASR-11  Digital Air Surveillance Radar providing PSR coverage of 60 miles and SSR 
coverage of 120 miles (Raytheon 2011). Radar provides digital processing, 
improved reliability, and improved performance not available in earlier models 
e.g. ASR-8 radar (Wolff 2011).  
ATC  Air Traffic Control 
AWEA  American Wind Energy Association 
CFAR  Constant False Alarm Rate 
Clutter  Electromagnetic energy echoes of unwanted targets 
CTBT  Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
dDms  Decibels Per Metre Squared 
DHS  Department of Homeland Security 
DOD  US Department of Defence 
DOE  US Department of Energy  
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Term   Definition 
Doppler  Apparent change in frequency or pitch when a moving object moves towards or 
away from a radar. Doppler monitoring indicates whether an object is moving 
towards or away from a radar and can be used to calculate the speed of 
movement (Wolff 2011). 
EWR  Missile Early Warning Radar 
FAA  Federal Aviation Administration 
FAATC  Federal Aviation Administration Technical Centre 
ft  Feet (3.28 ft equal 1 meter) 
Km  Kilometres 
LRR  Long Range Radar 
Mode-S  Mode Select 
MTD  Moving Target Detection 
MTI  Moving Target Indication 
MW  Megawatts 
NERL  (National Air Traffic System) En-Route Ltd 
NEXRAD  Next Generation Weather Radars 
Nmi  Nautical Miles 
NOAA  National Oceanic Atmospheric Administration 
PSR  Primary Surveillance Radar 
Radar  Radio Detection And Ranging 
Radar Cell  A radars view is split into a grid pattern. Each grid square is a radar „cell‟ which 
shows information for that specific area. Cells are used to compare and contrast 
returns with other cells in the grid (DOD 2006). 
RCS  Radar Cross Section – scale of electromagnetic energy reflectivity of an object 
SSR  Secondary Surveillance Radar 
Targets  Object of interest in the line of sight of a radar 
TARS  Tethered Aerostat Radar System. Balloon-bourne radar system used by 
government agencies to counter illegal drug trafficking (Aftergood 2000). 
UK  United Kingdom 
US  United States of America  
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Term   Definition 
WSR-88D  Next Generation weather radar that use Doppler maps to illustrate rain, hail, and 
snowfall patterns (DOD 2006)  
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Appendix 1: Addendum 
Introduction 
 
During the pilot study‟s research period, an interview with a DOD representative was sort to 
provide a key stakeholder perspective on US wind/radar issues. While this interview was 
unable to take place during the research period; post the conclusion of this pilot study David 
Belote (Director of the US DOD Energy Siting Clearing House) kindly made his time 
available to the author.  
 
The following addendum shares the outcomes of the author‟s interview with David Belote 
and summarises the significance of the interview results to the findings of this pilot study.   
The interview was conducted over the phone and under the guidance of a DOD media 
advisor. A recording of the interview was made by the DOD. 
 
Interview Results 
 
Effect of Wind Turbines on Radar (3.2) 
 
David Belote identified “...not being able to track small civilian aircraft” as one of the biggest 
concerns the DOD have related to wind farms. This interview response supports the pilot 
study findings that wind turbine shadow and clutter zones can hinder a radar‟s ability to 
track aircraft.  
 
Effect of Wind Turbines on Military Sites (3.3) 
 
Commenting on the split between the number of DOD concerns related to radar versus 
military sites, David Belote explained that some military testing facilities require “an 
electromagnetic pristine environment” for testing technologies such as stealth and radar. 
Belote added that the nature of testing is, “…sensitive as we can‟t talk about the frequency 
bands we use or what we are testing”. Adding, “The Bin Laden raids are a good example of 
the type of technology we might need to test”. In this comment Belote was referring to 
stealth-modified helicopter technology that is thought to have allowed US Navy Seals to 
evade the Pakistani radar network (Ross 2011).  
 
Belote indicated the DOD hope to get support for no wind turbine zones around required 
“pristine” testing sites. These interview outcomes confirm that electromagnetic interference 
caused by wind turbines is another central concern from the DOD.  
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DOD Energy Siting Clearing House (4.2.2)  
 
When asked about the impact that the establishment of the DOD Energy Siting Clearing 
House (Clearing House) has had on improving DOD and wind developer engagement, 
David Belote reinforced pilot study findings that the Clearing House has already started to 
deliver positive results, “In the first round we looked at every project held up by the 
Department of Defense… that was 249 projects covering 6300 turbines… We cleared 229 
of them which represent 10GW of renewable energy capacity”. Belote commented that the 
Clearing House “look at the projects from a long range radar angle, a military training angle, 
and from a military testing perspective.” This suggests the Clearing House also provides 
greater process efficiency than pilot study results indicate existed in the past. 
 
When asked about tools or processes that the Clearing House has put in place to make the 
assessment of an „acceptable level‟ of wind turbine interference more objective, Belote 
indicated the Clearing House currently uses Graphic Information System visualisation tools 
and military judgement to conduct an initial assessment. These findings are then backed up 
by a detailed analysis from the affected department (including some turbine by turbine 
impact assessment from the 84
th Radar Evaluation Squadron). Belote said a desktop 
modelling tool based on turbine by turbine assessment “is around 18 months away”. 
 
Evaluation of Proposed Solutions (5.3)  
 
Commenting on the split between the number of DOD concerns related to radar versus 
military sites, David Belote said he believed, “Most of the pure radar concerns could go 
away in the next 3-5 years. Scientists understand it, industry wants to solve it, and 
government wants to solve it. People will develop techniques to overcome the clutter 
rejection issues we see.”  
 
When asked which proposed technologies are most viable in delivering a wind/radar 
solution, Belote described the DOD as “technology agnostic” suggesting “there is not 
enough data to say one technology is better than another.” Belote added the DOD is 
currently testing a number of technology solutions. Stealth turbines however, will not be in 
the testing mix, “From my experience I know it‟s difficult to keep stealth stealthy. Stealth 
works in a given frequency band…its expensive… we aim to deliver solutions to the  
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problem more cheaply and quickly” Belote said. These interview outcomes reduce the pilot 
study results that stealth turbines could be endorsed by the DOD as a viable technology 
solution.  
 
Research (6.2.1)  
In reference to research being conducted to expand available solutions, David Belote said 
the DOD have paired up with the DOE and MIT Lincoln Laboratory to conduct “Interagency 
Field Test and Evaluation”. A process designed to compare available solutions. Belote said 
“They‟re taking a look at adaptive clutter mapping, in-fill radar, gap fill radar (to see behind 
turbines), Raytheon concurrent beam process (to track objects over and behind turbines), 
and Lockheed Martin pencil beam radar.” These interview outcomes also show that the 
DOD has invested over $3 million USD so far to develop a menu of DOD endorsed 
solutions. 
 
Funding (6.2.2)  
When asked about previous and future cost allocation for wind/radar mitigations, David 
Belote explained that historically “There‟s really only one example and that‟s at Travis Air 
Force Base. Thus far developers have borne the entire cost of optimisation and changes to 
display.” Looking forward Belote advocates that the DOD would be interested in promoting 
solutions that suit developer finances, “Speaking to industry, 1% of the cost of project 
seems to be a magic number. If the industry can create solutions such as in fill and gap fill 
at 1% cost then I think we‟ll have solutions developers are interested in”. These interview 
results expand the funding perspective provided in the pilot study results. 
 
Issue Next Steps (6.3)  
In line with pilot study results, David Belote focused on collaboration when asked about the 
next steps required to help resolve wind/radar concerns, “…we need to sit down with major 
developers and those affected, as there needs to be a cost sharing, and negotiate a public 
private partnership… It won‟t be easy but it has to be a team effort.” Belote Said. 
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